B. J. Anderson v. Eunice Shumway : Respondent\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1967
B. J. Anderson v. Eunice Shumway : Respondent's
Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Edward M. Garrett; Attorneys for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Anderson v. Shumway, No. 10794 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3974
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
B. J. ANDERSON, 
vs. 
Pmintiff and 
Appelmnt, 
Case No. 
10,794 
EUNICE SHUMWAY, 
Defendant and 
Respundent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from Judpnent of the 
Fourth District Court 
Utah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge 
'EDWARD M. GARRE'rr, far 
HANSON & GARRETT . 
520 Continental Bank ButlAt8 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 .. 
AttomqB for 
Def entlatn,t-BespoM.mt . 
JACKSON B. HOWABa. for 
HOWARD & LEWIS r=- i 1 ,_ D ~~North L ~ c, ; . t 
Attornqs for Lrn:.. 6 1967 
Plaintiff -AppellaM- ·-- ... 
, .. .-:..;./.:, !:upr .. me Co·Wt.--iitft,--
F 
.. ~ .. 
~'i'. ''~."!' 
~ ),;.;. ·Y,. 
~- ,.; ,,J 
1' ·:.t' •. 
• :i. .... 
' .>+~tr;~-
J 
' I INDEX 
ST A TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE ______________________ 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT -------------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------ 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------ 2 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
SUBMITTING THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY 
TO THE JURY ------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
CASES CITED 
Badger vs. Clayson ______ Utah 2d ______ , 422 
Pacific 2d 665 -------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
Cheney vs. Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 Pacific 81 __________________ 18 
Ewan -vs. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272, 399 
Pacific 2d 210 -------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
Larson vs. Evans, 12 Utah 2d, 245, 364 
Pacific 2d 1088 ------------------------------------------------------------ 9 
Moser vs. Z.C.M.I., 114 Utah 58, Pacific 2d 136 ______________ 16 
Poston 1'S. Clinton, 406 Pacific 2d 623 (Wash.) ____________ 18 
Roth vs. Spelts. 326 Pacific 2d 80 (Colo.) ______________________ 19 
Weenig Bros. vs. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 262 
Pacific 2d 491 _____________ ------------------------------------------------ 8 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
B. J. ANDERSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
EUNICE SHUMWAY, 
Defendant and 
Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10,794 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a personal injury action arising out of 
an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury and the jury 
found the issues in favor of the defendant, no cause 
of action. 
Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial was denied 
by the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the verdict of the jury and 
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the denial of his Motion For New Trial be reversed 
and that the case be remanded for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement Of Facts contained in the Brief 
of Appellant does not state all of the facts and gives 
only his version as to how this accident happened. 
He was the loser below. These facts should be stated, 
"not merely as the appellant contends them to be, 
but view, as they must on appeal, favorable to the 
verdict of the jury." Thus a further Statement Of 
Facts is in order. 
The automobile accident that gave rise to this 
action occurred at about 4 :30 o'clock p.m. on No-
vember 12, 1964. It had rained during the day and 
at this time the rain had changed to sleet or snow. 
The rnadway where the accident happened was wet. 
The place where the accident happened is east of 
Orem, Utah, in Utah County. Fourth South Street 
in Orem, Utah, goes directly east from Highway 
91 to top of a bluff some distance from Orem and 
then makes a sharp right turn downhill on an access 
road to the roads below which are in the Provo River 
area. The accident between the vehicles of plaintiff 
and defendant occurred on this curve. The scene of 
the accident can best be understood by reference to 
the two photographs reproduced below which were 
"Exhibits 4 and 6". "Exhibit 4" shows the direction 
of defendant's vehicle and "Exhibit 6" shows the 
direction of plaintiff's vehicle. There is no center 
line marked on the roadway. 
Exhibit 4 
Exhibit 6 
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It should be noted at this point that this curve 
is a blind curve and visibility of approaching traffic 
is essentially blocked out until a vehicle is into the 
curve. The improved portion of the roadway is ap-
proximately 21 feet in width and there is a gravel 
shoulder on each side of the road (Ex. P-1) . 
We turn now to the testimony of the two parties 
involved in this accident (there were no eye wit-
nesses other than the two drivers). 
Plaintiff - Plaintiff testified that he had got-
ten off work about 4 :00 o'clock p.m. and had driven 
from the Geneva Steel Works to Orem and then 
from U.S. 91 in Orem east on Fourth South to the 
place where this accident happened. He was alone 
in his white 1959 Oldsmobile automobile (Tr. 65). 
He testified that the weather was raining, turning 
to sleet or snow, and that his windshield was clear 
and he could see. He was approaching the intersec-
tion at approximately 20 miles per hour and slowed 
down as he entered the right hand turn to the south 
(Tr. 66). At that time he testified that he first saw 
the approaching car of defendant some 200 feet 
away, traveling in the center of the road and com-
ing directly toward him. He stated that he was al-
most stopped when the impact occurred and that the 
impact was a head-on glancing type collision. The 
front end of defendant's car struck the front end 
of his car. (Tr. 88). The defendant's car continued 
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around the curve and was stopped facing west on 
Fourth South Street. 
Defendant - Mrs. Eunice Shumway, the de-
fendant, was employed on this day doing day work 
for a Mrs. Harvey King at his residence at Elm 
Circle in Provo, Utah (Tr. 200). She owned a 1954 
Mercury two door autmobile, which was the vehicle 
involved in this accident. She resided at Lindon, 
Utah (Tr. 200). Mrs. Shumway was on her way 
home from work at the time this accident happened. 
She testified that it was raining hard and that 
it was difficult to see. The lights on her Mercury 
were on at the time of the accident (Tr. 201-202). 
Mrs. Shumway testified that as she proceeded up-
grade toward this curve the right wheels of her car 
were on the gravel and at the time of the collision 
her car was entirely on the right side of the center 
line. Her testimony in this regard is as follows: 
"Q. As you approached this intersection just 
tell us in your own words what happen-
ed? 
A. Well, it was raining real hard. I was 
driving quite slow. It was hard for me 
to see, and as I got up there I just start-
ed to making the turn as this car hit, 
and I stopped. 
Q. Did you see the car of Mr. Anderson be-
fore the impact? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Where was your vehicle in relation to 
this intersection when the accident hap-
pened? 
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A. It was on the side of the road. As I went 
up the road I kept my one wheel off on 
the gravel. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Let me ask you this question: Where was 
your car at the time of this accident in 
relationship to what we might call the 
center line of the roadway? 
It was on the side of the road. 
Which side? 
A. On the right side." 
(Tr. 202-203) 
It is evident from the testimony of the two par-
ties involved that they view the happening of this 
accident in complete opposition. The plaintiff claims 
that the defendant struck him head-on at a time 
when his vehicle was partially off the road on his 
side of the road. The defendant on the other hand 
states that her vehicle was entirely on her side of 
the road when the accident happened. Under the 
point of argument in this case it will be shown con-
clusively that the plaintiff's version of how the ac-
cident happened is inherently improbable. 
The only other person who has any knowledge 
of this accident was the investigating officer, Sgt. 
J. Reed Burgener, of the Orem City Police. He ar-
rived at the scene of the accident and observed the 
two vehicles, and found that the plaintiff's vehicle 
had made a right turn and was facing south and 
that the defendants vehicle had made the turn and 
was then facing west on the 4th south street. 
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He first inquired as to whether either of the 
drivers had been injured. He had some conversation 
with both drivers but was vague as to what they 
told him concerning the accident. (Tr. 53) He then 
had the plaintiff, Mr. Anderson, assist him in an 
investigation of the roadway. It was raining and 
visibility was poor. (Tr. 53). Mr. Anderson held 
the tape at the edge of the blacktop on the access 
road and the officer measured a paved roadway of 
21 feet (Tr. 54). He testified that he found some 
mud on the roadway in the vicinity of the vehicle of 
the plaintiff, and testified that it was more than 13 
feet from the east side of the blacktop which would 
put it in the lane of travel of the plaintiff. (Tr. 31). 
The officer could not determine the probable point 
of impact between the two vehicles. There were no 
skid marks from either vehicle. (Tr. 29). All he 
found was some mud and dirt on the roadway in the 
vicinity of the vehicle of plaintiff and in his opinion 
it came from the vehicles involved in the accident. 
(Tr. 30) . He very candidly admitted also that he 
could have made a determination from both vehic"les 
to find where the dirt and mud had come from, if 
in fact it had dropped from under one of the ve-
hicles, but he did not do this. (Tr. 45) He also testi-
fied that he did not know from which vehicle the 
mud had come and admitted that it could have come 
from any point underneath either car. His testimony 
was of little assistance to the jury in enabling it to 
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determine which of these vehicles had encroached on 
the lane of travel of the other. 
The case was then submitted to the jury on 
proper instructions of negligence and contributory 
negligence and the jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE THIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUB-
MITTING THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY TO THE 
JURY. 
The plaintiff-appellant lists three points of 
argument namely, that the Court erred in failing 
to direct a verdict on the issue of liability and in 
submitting the issues of plaintiffs contributory neg-
ligence and defendant's negligence to the jm·y. Re-
duced to their essence the argument of plaintiff is 
that the Court erred in submitting the issue of lia-
bility to the jury. The facts of this case viewed with-
in the framework of legal principles repeatedly an-
nounced by this Court will show that the argument 
of plaintiff must fail. He caused the accident. The 
jury so found. 
In the case of W eenig Bros. vs. Manning, 1 
Utah 2d 101, 262 Pacific 2d 491, this Court stated: 
"In order to upset the judgment and 
command one in its favor, the first obstacle 
plaintiff must overcome is to demonstrate 
that the evidence shows with such certainty 
that reasonable minds could not differ there-
on that the defendant was guilty of negli-
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gence which proximately caused the collision. 
In the absence of such degree of proof we 
could not direct that such finding be made 
and reverse the decision of the lower court. 
The defendant having prevailed, on conflict-
ing matters the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to him." 
An in the case of Larson vs. Evans, 12 Utah 2d, 
245, 364 Pacific 2d 1088, our Court said: 
"The major issue thus presented is: Was 
the evidence so compelling against a finding 
of contributory negligence on the part of Jon 
Larson as to require a finding on the question 
in his favor as a matter of law? In order to 
upset the verdict and command one in the 
plaintiffs' favor the evidence must show with 
such certainty that reasonable minds could 
not differ thereon that the plaintiff, Jon Lar-
son, merely did what a prudent person would 
have done under the circumstances. The de-
fendant having prevailed below, the evidence 
on conflicting matters must be view in the 
light most favorable to him." 
Applicable also is the statement of this Court 
in the case of Ewan vs. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272, 
399 Pacific 2d 210: 
"In order to justify the trial court's dis-
missal, the evidence must show with sufficient 
certainty that reasonable minds would not 
differ thereon that plaintiff was negligent 
and that her negligence was a proximate 
cause of her injury. It should be borne in mind 
that the defendant has the burden of proving 
both of those issues by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Consequently, if there is any 
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reasonable basis in the evidence, or from lack 
of evidence, upon which fairminded jurors 
could reasonably remain unconvinced on eith-
er or both of those issues, then the trial court 
was not justified in ruling against her as a 
matter of law." 
Appropriate also is the statement of Justice 
Henriod in his concurring opinion in the case of 
Badger v. Clayson, ______ Utah 2d ______ , 422 Pacific 
2d 665: 
"The crux of this case revolves around 
one instruction given by the court supple-
mented by interrogatories presented to the 
jury. The jury decided six to two in favor of 
Clayson. Had this writer been on the jury, he 
is inclined to the conclusion reached by the 
two dissenting jurors. But that cannot sub-
stitute for our jury system." 
With the above principles in mind our next in-
quiry must be into the facts, viewed as they must 
be, favorable to the defendant, and then determine 
if there was sufficient evidence before the lower 
court to justify submission of the issue of liability 
of the jury on conflicting facts and inferences. 
The accident happened November 12, 1964 at 
approximately 4 :30 p.m. It had rained during the 
day and at this hour in the vicinity of this accident 
the rain was turning to sleet and snow. It was over-
cast and misty and visibility was poor according to 
the investigating officer. The plaintiff was driving 
a 1959 Oldsmobile automobile, white in color. He 
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did not have his headlights on. (Tr. 88). The de-
fendant on the other hand did have her headlights 
on, (Tr. 202) , and she had dimmed her lights on her 
way from where she worked to where this accident 
happened (Tr. 202). We may reasonably infer 
from this testimony that headlights on this day and 
at that time were necessary. We may also infer that 
the plaintiff's white automobile without headlights 
presented a difficult object for an approaching mo-
torist to see. 
The roadway on which the plaintiff was travel-
ing before the accident goes straight east from U.S. 
91 in Orem, Utah, to the top of the bench and then 
turns sharply to the right and downhill to the river 
bottom. The so called "access road" from this is only 
21 feet in width and would be classified as a narrow 
road. The area of the accident is difficult to describe 
in words and can best be seen pictorially from the 
photographs that have been reproduced in this brief. 
These views show this particular corner from the 
direction each driver was traveling and give a fair 
representation of the visibility that each driver had. 
The curve is essentially blind - approaching driv-
ers have no opportunity to see one another until the 
turn is completed. 
The plaintiff's theory of the case supported by 
his testimony only, is that he approached the curve 
traveling approximately 20 miles per hour and slow-
ed down somewhat as he entered the turn. At that 
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moment he observed the approaching vehicle of the 
defendant, some 200 feet away and noted that she 
was encroaching on his half of the roadway. He was 
traveling approximately 15 miles an hour when he 
was struck headon. (Tr. 88-90). 
Contrasted to the testimony of the plaintiff is 
that of the defendant concerning her position on 
the roadway when this accident occurred. Her testi-
mony was clear and explicit - that as she proceeded 
northbound up this access roadway she was entirely 
on her side of the road, and, in fact, because of its 
narrowness her practice was to have her right 
wheels off the paved portion onto the shoulder. She 
had just reached the top of the hill and had started 
to turn when her vehicle was struck by the plaintiff. 
She testified that at all times while proceeding up 
this access road her car was on her side of the road 
and was on her side of the road at the time she was 
struck by the plaintiff. 
There were no skid marks leading up to a prob-
able point of impact and the only other evidence is 
that of the investigating officer who found some 
mud on the road but made no attempt to find out 
which part of which car the mud came from, and 
indeed, it could have come from under either car 
and from any point under either car. 
The testimony of the defendant is entirely con-
sistent with the exercise of due care. She was travel-
ing at a reasonable rate of speed ( 25 miles per hour) 
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and she was traveling on her side of the road. Ad-
mittedly, she did not see the plaintiff's vehicle until 
impact but this is explained due to the fact that this 
was a blind curve; that plaintiff was driving a 
white vehicle with its lights off against a back-
ground of sleet and snow. These facts are not suf-
ficient for a jury to find negligence on the part of 
the defendant. 
We turn now to the negligence of the plaintiff. 
These facts are established: Plaintiff was driving a 
white Oldsmobile against a background of snow and 
sleet. He did not have his lights on and it is apparent 
from the testimony of the defendant that lights were 
necessary on account of the weather. He had reduc-
ed his speed from approximately 20 miles an hour 
as he proceeded east to 15 miles an hour as he round-
ed the turn and started downhill. He testified that 
the collision was a head-on glancing collision. Under 
these circumstances we would expect to find front 
end damage to both vehicles. The front end of his 
car was damaged. This is shown by the repair bill 
introduced in evidence (Exhibit 10) which shows 
that the left front headlight of his car was replaced. 
However, when we view the two photographs of the 
defendant's vehicle which have been reproduced 
herein, we see immediately that the damage to the 
defendant's vehicle was not on the left front but 
rather on the left fender behind the headlight. The 
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attitude of the two vehicles on impact is apparent 
from the damage that was done. The vehicle of de-
fendant was traveling straight and the vehicle of 
plaintiff was angled in such a way that the left 
front corner of plaintiff's vehicle struck the left 
fender of defendant's vehicle. This is exactly what 
would be expected of a vehicle that was making a 
sharp turn to the right as was plaintiff and had 
encroached over the center line. These physical facts 
are entirely consistent with the testimony of the de-
fendan t. On the other hand, however, they show 
that the accident could not have occurred as plain-
tiff suggests. He testified that his vehicle was par-
tially off the road and against the bank when he 
was struck a glancing, head-on blow by the defen-
dant. Were this the case we would have found dam-
age on the front end of the defendant's car. There 
was none. 
He testified further that he had an opportunity 
to observe the defendant's car for some 200 feet and 
that it came straight toward him. The only possible 
way that the accident could have produced the dam-
age it did was for the vehicle of the defendant to 
have been entirely in his lane of travel and suddenly 
have made a sharp turn to the right just before the 
two cars impacted. This is the only way that defen-
dant could have avoided front end damage. There is 
no testimony that this is the way the collision oc-
curred and the only conclusion that can be drawn is 
that the accident did not happen in the way that 
plaintiff testified. 
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There was ample evidence before the jury that 
the defendant was not negligent as alleged by plain-
tiff and ample evidence before the jury that the 
plaintiff was negligent in the manner that he oper-
ated his vehicle. At most, the evidence was conflict-
ing and reasonable men could reach different con-
clusions. Such being the case a clear jury question 
was presented and the jury resolved these issues 
against the plaintiff. 
A Utah case very similar to the case at bar is 
Moser vs. Z.C.M.I., 114 Utah 58, 197 Pac. 2d 136: 
The accident in this case happened approximately 
l:Y2 miles south of Logan, Utah, on the highway 
between Logan and Ogden. It happened about 7 :30 ' 
p.m. October 10, 1945. It had rained during the day 
and the road was wet. It was dark and both vehicles 
had their headlights on. The roadway at the point 
of collision was approximately 22 feet in width. 
The collision between the two vehicles occurred just 
south of a highway bridge. The plaintiff testified 
that as the defendant's south-bound truck crossed 
the bridge it jerked slightly, then came into the 
plaintiff's lane of travel and turned to the right 
just before impact and that plaintiff struck the left 
rear of defendant's truck. The defendant's driver 
testified that as the north-bound vehicle of plaintiff 
approached him that it gradually encroached in his 
lane of travel and that he moved as far to the right 
as he could and actually scraped the bridge abut-
ment and after he left the bridge he turned his ve-
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hicle furthe1· to the right at which time he was 
st1·uck by the plaintiff. The investigating officer 
testified that the1·e we1·e tire tracks on the right 
shoulder of the mad which lead from the bridge to 
the barrnw-pit where the defendant's vehicle was 
ove1·turnecl. This, of course, would indicate that de-
fendant's vehicle was on its right side of the road 
when the accident happened. However, the officer 
also testified that there was nothing on the highway 
that would indicate a point of collision. There was 
no evidence that either driver made any application 
of brakes. There were no skid marks found at the 
scene of the accident. 
The evidence of the parties in this lawsuit was 
conflicting. Both claimed that the other had en-
croached on the wrong side of the highway. Our 
Court announced the following principle: 
"The ultimate question of fact in this 
case, is of com·se, which of the two drivers 
failed to keep his vehicle upon his proper side 
of the mad. It is clear that at least one of 
them crossed the center line. The determina-
tion of this ultimate fact was for the jury. 
And the jm·y having determined this question 
in plaintiff's favor, and the trial Court hav-
ing denied defendant's motion for new trial, 
this Court cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion unless there was no sub-
stantial evidence to support the verdict, or in 
other words, that all reasonable minds must 
agree that it was plaintiff, and not defendant, 
Rogers, who transgressed the center line of 
the highway." 
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The Court then commented on the respective 
theories and evidence of the parties and concluded 
that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
verdict in favor of plaintiff. The verdict and judg-
ment of the lower court was affirmed. 
An ear lier Utah case to the same effect is 
Cheney vs. Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 Pacific 81. This 
was an automobile-bicycle accident that occurred 
in Layton, Utah. Each of the parties contended that 
the other had failed to yield half the traveled por-
tion of the highway. In this regard the Court held: 
"It is undisputed that the respondent 
was not going over four miles per hour on his 
bicycle. That he was on the right side of the 
traveled road seems well established, but 
whether he was not was for the jury to say, 
not for the Court." 
These Utah cases establish the proposition that 
where there is evidence from which a jury could 
find that one or the other, or both, of two vehicles 
involved in a collision, had encroached over the cen-
ter line, then the question of liability is one for the 
JUry. 
The trial judge correctly applied these princi-
ples to this case. He committed no error in submit-
ting the issue of liability to the jury. 
Cases from other jurisdictions support the legal 
conclusion set forth above. For analogous cases see 
Poston vs. Clinton, 406 Pac. 2d 623 (Wash.). This 
accident involved two vehicles that collided head-on 
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on a paved highway divided by a white center strip. 
Each driver claimed that the other had encroached 
on his side of the highway and each claimed that the 
negligence of the other had caused the accident. In 
regard to the issue of liability the Court stated: 
"On the first point, we think the trial 
court properly refused to grant a directed 
verdict in favor of the appellants. The evi-
dence with reference to the point of impact 
consisted of circumstantial evidence (such as 
the debris on the highway, a long gouge in 
the pavement evidently made by the Clinton 
automobile, the position of the cars after the 
accident), the testimony of eyewitnesses and 
expert witnesses as to the point of impact. 
There was sufficient evidence from which the 
jury, as trier of the fact, could find that the 
point of impact was in either the northerly 
or southerly traffic lane or the jury could 
have believed that there was no preponder-
ance of evidence in favor of either side." 
The jury verdict in favor of defendant was re-
versed on other grounds. 
In Roth vs. Spelts, 326 Pac. 2d 80 (Colo.) the 
two approaching vehicles collided on a curve. Aver-
dict for plaintiffs was affirmed on appeal, the Court 
noting: 
"The facts and circumstances relating to 
the conduct of the parties at the time and im-
mediately preceding the impact, and questions 
concerning the credibility of the several wit-
nesses, presented questions which could only 
be resolved by the jury. To justify the with-
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drawal of a case from the jury, not only 
should the facts be undisputed, but the con-
clusions to be drawn from those facts should 
be indisputable. 
The jury determined that the accident 
was the proximate result of the negligence 
of defendants and resolved the issue of con-
tributory negligence against them, all of this 
under instructions which are not challenged." 
(It should be noted that the appellant in the 
case at bar does not challenege the Court's instruc-
tions.) 
For numerous other cases supporting the pro-
position set forth above see Digest Key No. 245 
( 13). (Automobiles). 
CONCLUSION 
The accident in this case occurred about 4 :30 
p.m. on November 12, 1964. Visibility was poor; it 
had been raining and the rain was turning to sleet 
and snow at the time the accident happened. The 
accident happened on a curve on a roadway that 
proceeds east from Orem to the top of the bluff and 
then makes a sharp right turn downhill to the river 
bottom roads below. The curve is a blind curve. Ap-
proaching drivers do not have visibility, one of the 
other, until the turn is almost completed. The road-
way is also quite narrow being only approximately 
21 feet in width. There are no center lines marking 
the road. The plaintiff was driving a white Oldsmo-
bile without his lights on, although the evidence 
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would support the conclusion that lights were neces-
sary at that time. 
The defendant testified that as she went uphill 
from the river bottom road her car was entirely on 
her side of the road and it stayed on her side of the 
1 
road up to the impact. Plaintiff on the other hand 
testified that he observed the approaching car of 
defendant and that she had crossed the center line 
some distance before the accident and that he had 
pulled to the right and was struck essentially head-
on. This presents a clear conflict of fact to be resolv-
ed by the jury. The ultimate question was which of 
these drivers had transgressed the center line and 
this question, as in the Moser case, (Supra) was for 
the jury. 
We also point out that when the physical evi-
dence of damage on the two vehicles is considered 
the theory of plaintiff as to how the accident hap-
pened is not suppm'ted. The damage on his car was 
on the left front corner. The damage on the vehicle 
of defendant was behind the left headlight on the 
left fender. There was no damage on the front end 
and this is clearly seen by the Exhibits reproduced 
in this brief. Had this collision been a head-on col-
lision as suggested by plaintiff then surely one 
would expect to find damage on the front end of 
both cars. The most i·easonable explanation for the 
accident is that the plaintiff encroached over the 
cente1· line as he was making a right turn and the 
left front of his car struck the left fender of the de-
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fendant's car at an angle. This physical evidence of 
damage is consistent with the testimony of defen-
dant but not consistent with the testimony of plain-
tiff. The jury verdict in favor of the defendant is 
amply supported by this evidence and the trial court 
was entirely justified in submitting the issue of neg-
ligence and contributory negligence to the jury. 
The verdict and judgment of the lower court 
must be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD M. GARRETT, for 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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